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An Exploratory Eeonornetrie Analysis of Shared Electronic Banking Network Adoption 
Abstract 
What are the determinants of early interorganizational system (10s) adoption? 
This paper focuses on a specific kind of IOS -- shared electronic banking networks -- and 
employs an economic approach that views adoption and diffusion in terms of cost and 
benefit. We attempt to identify firm characteristics that are likely to influence the 
perceived busiiress value of network membership and develop specific hypotheses that can 
be tested empirically using historical data in a realistic setting. We undertake an 
exploratory econometric analysis of the adoption of Yankee 24, a large shared electronic 
banking network in the northeastern United States. Using Bass' analytical diffusion 
model, we categorize Yankee 24 network members into earlier and later adopters. 
Probit models are estimated to assess the impact of explanatory variables on shared 
electronic banking network adoption. The number of branch offices operated by a bank, 
its total demand deposits, and the proportion of its total deposits accounted for by 
demand deposits are found to be important predictors of earlier adoption. We find that 
the number of branch offices operated by a bank, a proxy for the size of its proprietary 
network, has a negative impact on early adoption, which contradicts the common wisdom 
that a large firm size is a prerequisite for adoption of technological innovations. 
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1. Introduction 
Interorganizational systems (IOSs), automated information system shared by two or 
more companies (Cash and Konsynski, 1985), are rapidly becoming a competitive 
necessity in business, and are likely to have fundamental impacts on transactions in a 
wide variety of industries. For example, the strategic use of electronic data interchange 
(EDI), a category of IOS, has been suggested to improve a firm's overall operational 
productivity and to enhance its competitive advantage. Canright (1988) reported that 
ED1 was being used by 75% of the Fortune 100 and 39% of the Fortune 500 by January 
1988 to perform traditional business communications processes. Although ED1 
deployment is still in its early stages, market researchers have estimated that the market 
should observe explosive growth, ranging from 40% to 80% of the current installed base 
through the 1990s. 
Several studies have documented successful applications of IOSs, including 
regionally shared electronic banking networks in the middle Atlantic United States 
(Banker and Kauffman, 1991; Clemons, 1990), the CIRRUS and PLUS nationally shared 
electronic banking networks (Kauffman and Wang, 1993), airline computerized 
reservation systems (CRS) (Copeland and McKenney, 1988), and wholesale distribution 
systems (Clemons and Row, 1988). Other well known IOSs include the securities 
settlement system that operates after financial market trades are made (Weiss, 1986), 
credit card switching and transaction confirmation systems (Steiner and Teixeira, 1990), 
and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) that 
has traditionally provided telecommunications links between international commercial 
banks to permit the exchange of payment information. 
Because average costs decrease as the size of operations and transactions volume 
increase, firms can achieve economies of scale in developing, introducing, and operating 
networks, and deliver high levels of customer service by offering comprehensive 
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geographic coverage. In addition to economies of scale, IOSs often exhibit positive 
network consumption externalities for network members: the benefit that a member derives 
from a network increases as other fim join the network (Rohlfs, 1974). Because of scale 
economies and network externalities, the dynamics of network goods have been suggested 
to be fundamentally different from those of conventional technological innovations (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1986a). Markus (1987) argued that communications technologies have 
characteristics not shared by many other traditional technological innovations, and 
traditional explanations of diffusion of innovations do not accommodate these 
characteristics. A recent study by 07Callaghan, Kaufmann, and Konsynski (1992) also 
points out that the adoption of ED1 is significantly different from the adoption of an 
innovative technology. 
IOSs change the nature of competition significantly, and can have a far-reaching 
impact on the structure of entire industries (Bakos, 1991). To date, however, there have 
been only few empirical studies examining the factors that influence IOS adoption, and 
almost none has reported the determinants of IOS adoption employing historical data. 
This paper focuses on shared electronic banking networks, a subset of IOSs (Johnston 
and Vitale, 1988), to examine the determinants of adoption. By viewing the adoption 
and diffusion of shared electronic banking networks primarily in terms of cost and 
benefit, we attempt to identify firm characteristics that are likely to influence the 
perceived business value and thus the adoption of a shared electronic banking network at 
the level of individual banks. We undertake an econometric analysis of the adoption of 
Yankee 24, the dominant shared electronic banking network in the New England area of 
the United States. Yankee 24 network members are categorized into earlier and later 
adopters using Bass' analytical diffusion model (Bass, 1969) as the theoretical basis. 
Probit analyses are then performed to assess the impact of the determinants of shared 
electronic banking network adoption, using a data set that includes Yankee 24 adoption 
data and firm characteristics for banks in our sample. The results are compared with 
prior work on technology adoption, especially Hannan and McDowell (1984) and Saloner 
and Shepard (1991), who investigated the adoption of automated teller machines (ATMs) 
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without sharing. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the theoretical basis for 
adopter categories and reviews prior studies of technology adoption and diffusion to 
identify factors that may influence IOS adoption. Section 3 begins with a description of 
IOS adoption in electronic banking, followed by a discussion of the determinants of 
shared electronic banking network adoption and the development of the study 
hypotheses. In addition, we argue that firm size is not related to innovativeness by 
logical necessity. Section 4 describes the Yankee 24 shared electronic banking network, 
sample and data collection, and presents the results of the econometric analysis. The 
conclusions of this study and discussions follow. 
2. Prior Research 
Although some work has focused on the adoption of IOSs, in general, and ATM 
technology, in particular, there has been very little research done on the adoption of 
shared electronic banking networks. We draw on prior research on adoption and 
diffusion of traditional technological innovations, which has dealt with issues such as the 
growth pattern of adoption, the categorization of adopters, and the individual adoption 
process. 
2.1. Adopter Categories 
Historically, innovation diffusion research has centered on innovativeness and 
related variables, especially the characteristics of earlier versus later adopters (Brancheau 
and Wetherbe, 1990). The most widely accepted method of categorizing innovation 
adopters was proposed by Rogers (1983). The method assumes that the non-cumulative 
adopter distribution over time takes the form of a bell-shaped curve. Rogers' 
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classification results from the division of the normal adopter distribution into categories 
based on mean time of adoption and the standard deviation of those times. The 
classification scheme includes five adopter categories: (1) innovators (the first 2.5%), (2) 
early adopters (13.5%), (3) early majority (34%), (4) late majority (34%), and (5) 
laggards (16%). They are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Rogers' categorization, however, has limitations. Mahajan, Muller, and Srivastava 
(1990) pointed out that the assumption that all innovations follow a normally-distributed 
diffusion pattern is questionable. And, in spite of the method's simplicity, Rogers 
provided no empirical or analytical justification of why the size of the adopter categories 
should be the same for all innovations. We think this is an important issue in the context 
of innovations that exhibit network externalities. Various authors have pointed to the 
existence of network externalities that are associated with some kinds of technological 
innovations, such as railroad track gauges, VCR standards, microcomputer operating 
systems, and computer microprocessors (Farrell and Saloner, 1985 and 1986; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985, 1986a and 1986b). As a result, the adoption path may be skewed or 
disrupted: (1) there may be a prolonged period of adoption inertia as competing firms 
play a "wait-and-see" adoption game; or (2) there may be a wholesale rush to adopt. 
This is called the barzdwagon efjrect by economists; it results when firms perceive that 
there are industry-wide expectations that one alternative will be selected, thereby making 
it an industry standard. 
Mahajan, Muller, and Srivastava further proposed using Bass' diffusion model as a 
basis for adopter categorization. Their proposal subsumes the advantageous features of 
Rogers' method and resolves some of its limitations. Instead of arbitrarily dividing the 
adopter distribution into a number of categories, the authors exploit certain unique 
analytical properties of Bass' diffusion model to generate adopter categories in which the 
shape of the adopter distribution is data-specific (captured by the coefficients of difision 
models). The real contribution here is that one can make inter-study comparisons based 
on common values of diffusion model parameters describing the adopter distribution. 
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Figure 1. Rogers' Adopter Categories 
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The S-shaped cumulative adopter distribution, F(t), from Bass (1969), is given by: 
F(t) = ( 1 - e - @ + a t )  / ( 1 + (qlp) e - @ + a t )  (1) 
where p is referred to as the coeficient of innovation and q is the coeficient of imitation. 
The expression for the time interval of early adoption is: 
TI = -In [ ( 2+q3 ) plq ] / (p+q) (2) 
It defines those who adopt up to the end of time interval TI as earlier adopters 
(either innovators or early adopters). Table 1 summarizes the analytic expressions for 
the time interval and size of adopter categories based on Bass' diffusion model. Once 
the values of p and q are derived by fitting the cumulative adopter distribution expressed 
in Equation (I), TI can be estimated. Mahajan, Muller, and Srivastava (1990) further 
examined the diffusion of personal computers and showed that tne adopter categories 
based on the Bass model can be used to study differences among their profiles. 
Table 1. The Bass Model: Analytical Expressions for Adopter Categories 
Adopter 
Category 
Early 
Adopters 
Innovators 
Early 
Majority 
Time Internal Covered 
in Adopter Distribution 
Initiation of the 
d f i s ion  process I --- 
Later 
Majority 
Laggards 
T' to T2 
ln[(2 + q3)] 
T2 until innovation is 
replaced 
Expression for 
Time Interval 
Note: p is referred to as the coeficient of innovation and q is the coeficient of imitation. 
Expression for the 
Adopter Category Size 
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This approach can be employed to investigate differences between earlier and 
later adopters of a shared electronic banking network. By using network membership 
adoption data, we can categorize the adopters by fitting the cumulative adopter 
distribution (expressed in Equation (1)) to obtain TI, instead of arbitrarily dividing the 
adopter distribution into two categories. Those banking firms that adopted before TI are 
categorized as earlier adopters; all others are later adopters. 
2.2. Factors Influencing IOS Adoption and Diffusion 
At the general level, two approaches, diffusion theoretic and economic, inform 
innovation diffusion research (Attewell, 1992), although there are other perspectives in 
studying technology adoption and diffusion. The diffusion theoretic approach views 
diffusion as a process of communication and influence whereby potential users become 
informed about the availability of new technology and are persuaded to adopt, through 
communication with prior users (Rogers, 1983). Thus, firms closely connected to users of 
an innovation learn about it and adopt it early on, whereas firms at the periphery of 
communication networks are slower to adopt. In other words, the dominant explanatory 
variable for the spread of technological innovations emphasizes processes of influence 
and information flow, and researchers have examined the roles of persons and patterns 
of communication and influence within the adopting firm (Attewell, 1992). Brown 
(1981), however, criticized the view of adoption as primarily the outcome of a learning or 
communication process because it emphasizes demand for an innovation by potential 
adopters, limited only by their innovativeness. 
Innovation adoption and diffusion research from a behavioral perspective suggests 
that the adoption of innovations is related to the attributes of the innovations as 
perceived by potential adopters. In particular, the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes has a direct impact on the 
likelihood of adoption (Rogers 1983). Of these attributes, relative advantage and 
compatibility with present systems have been cited as the most important attributes 
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(Tornatzky and Klein, 1982). In a recent field survey of ED1 adoption, O'Callaghan et 
al, (1992) examined the adoption of a particular form of EDI, the computer-based 
interface offerings by insurance carriers to their independent agent communities. They 
argued that variance in firm-level adoption of ED1 should reflect differences in the 
perceived relative advantage of EDI. Using multiple measures for the proposed 
constructs in a field survey, they found that the target firm's perception of the costs and 
benefits of ED1 linkage are the most crucial inputs in its decision whether to adopt the 
ED1 technology. However, they are not able to find any positive impact of influence 
wielded by other adopting agents, source firm, or formal industry structures on the 
decision to adopt an ED1 linkage. 
The sociopolitical approach is concerned about power, dependence, and conflict 
(Gaski, 1984). In particular, this approach examines the social and political forces and 
their impact on inter-organizational relationships. It is argued that a firm forms inter- 
organizational linkages primarily to gain control over critical resources and thereby 
reduce uncertainty in their acquisition. Although there is some evidence that suggests 
power relationships between participating firms in an IOS can have a significant impact 
on EDI, this approach seems less applicable in the context of shared electronic banking 
networks, the ownership of which is typically shared and where there is no buyer-supplier 
type relationship 
In a study of technology adoption in the commercial banking industry, Pennings 
and Harianto (1992) examined the propensity of banks to adopt a specific new form of 
information technology: video banking services (referred to as videotex), a computer- 
based interactive system that electronically deliver screen text, numbers and graphics. 
They found support for their hypothesis that prior experience in information technology 
and interfirm linkages with extramural sources of technology are important precursors to 
innovation and crucial for explaining banks' decision to adopt videotex. Firm size, 
however, also predicts the odds of entering the videotex industry. It is likely that firm 
size is correlated with the authors' measure of prior experience with information 
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technology and with interfirm linkages, and thus it acts as a workable surrogate. 
Studies of technology adoption and diffusion using the approaches discussed above 
are numerous. Many of them have attempted to identify factors that influence adoption 
and diffusion using subjective measures for some proposed constructs, and thus may be 
subject to measurement problems. The economic approach, on the other hand, views 
diffusion primarily in terms of cost and benefit. In general, the economics literature 
posits, ceterisparibus, that the length of time a firm waits to adopt a technique is 
inversely related to the profitability of the installation. In other words, the higher the 
cost, the slower diffusion will occur, and the higher the perceived profit from an 
innovation, the faster adoption will occur. 
The most widely tested theory of the diffusion of innovation was advanced by 
Mansfield (1968). His main theory consists of two points: (1) the diffusion of an 
innovation throughout an industry follows a logarithmic curve, which is a function of the . 
relative profitability of the innovation and the initial investment required; and (2) the 
rate of diffusion is more rapid in more competitive industries. 
Romeo (1977) provided a further test of the usefulness of the model of the 
imitation process developed by Mansfield. He investigated how the characteristics of the 
early users of numerical control machines differed from those that were slower to use 
them. Firm size, profitability of the innovation to the firm, and progressiveness of 
management were identified as the factors that were most likely to influence whether or 
not a firm would use the innovation. Because the profitability of the installation for each 
finn could not be obtained and the progressiveness of management was not adequately 
measured, only firm size was found to be important. 
Davies (1979) argued that Mansfield's model is too mechanistic. It has little to say 
about the nature of the adoption decision at the firm level, where there may be major 
differences between firms in their expectations of how profitable an innovation will be. 
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Further, the lag before adopting the innovation probably will differ significantly -- even 
.1 
among firms of the same size within the same industry. 
Hannan and McDowell (1984) used data on the adoption of ATMs by banking 
firms to examine the relationship between the decision to adopt new technology and the 
determinants of that decision. They found that larger banks, banks operating in more 
concentrated local banking markets, and banks that were part of bank holding company 
organizations evidenced a higher probability of adoption of ATM technology. Little 
sharing of electronic banking assets occurred at that time, however: ATMs had just been 
introduced. With more widespread use of ATMs in the banking industry, the trend has 
been toward shared electronic banking networks, and toward network consolidation and 
interstate banking. (Felgran and Ferguson (1986) and McAndrews (1991) provide useful 
reviews of shared banking network evolution). 
Saloner and Shepard (1991) employed an econometric model to test the impact of 
explanatory variables on the timing of ATM adoption among banking firms in the U.S. 
They found that a bank's date of adoption is earlier the larger the number of its branches 
(a proxy for the proprietary network benefits to the bank in adopting ATM) and the 
larger the value of its deposit base (a proxy for the number of users). Again, because 
there was little sharing of ATMs in the time frame of their study, the focus was on the 
benefits of adoption in the presence of proprietary ATM network effects. 
Although many studies have attempted to ascertain the effect of profitability on 
the firm's adoption decision, most of them have been largely unsuccessful, probably due 
to measurement problems (Jensen, 1982). We employ an economic approach to IOS 
adoption, and attempt to identify firm characteristics that may influence the business 
value of network adoption to a potential adopting firm and thus its adopting decision. 
Those firm characteristics can be adequately measured and their impact can be assessed 
using historical data in a realistic setting. 
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3. Shared Electronic Banking Network Adoption and Hypotheses 
In this section, we identify key factors that are likely to influence managers' shared 
.electronic banking network adoption decision. We focus on the impact of firm 
characteristics on the net benefits of adopting the shared network and thus on the 
probability of early adoption. The basic hypothesis is that the adoption of a shared 
electronic banking network is a rational economic decision: the greater the perceived 
business value of network membership, the earlier the adoption. To facilitate the 
discussion of key variables that contribute to the net benefits of network adoption and 
the development of hypotheses, we begin with a brief description of IOS adoption in 
.electronic banking. 
3.1. IOS Adoption and Diffusion in Electronic Banking 
ATMs are used to provide electronic banking services to bank customers. 
However, they involve expensive telecommunications and computer technology. Thus 
only large banking firms with a large transaction volume can justify installing ATMs or 
establishing ATM networks by spreading the costs and taking advantage of scale 
economies. Because of their comprehensive geographic coverage, the larger the installed 
base of an ATM network, the more attractive it is to customers. 
To protect themselves from losing market share to the bigger banks in the market, 
many depository financial institutions have turned to shared electronic banking networks, 
in which each participant only needs to make a small amount of investment in electronic 
banking on-site. Shared ATM networks allow one bank's customer to access an account 
using ATMs owned by other network members at locations that are convenient for the 
customer at a given time. By joining shared electronic banking networks, therefore, 
smaller banking firms are able to offer their customers a higher density of ATM locations 
and greater access to their bank accounts, at the same level that large banking firms can 
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provide -- without the corresponding capital costs. Finally, some owners of proprietary 
networks recognize that they may not be able to offer the same locational convenience as 
shared electronic banking networks, and may have begun to join shared electronic 
banking networks in order to generate more revenue and remain competitive. 
Figure 2 presents a typical shared electronic banking network, involving three 
banks, A, B, and C. The shared network organization serves as the switch in the 
network, linking member banks' ATMs to a central switch that routes a transaction from 
the ATM used by a card holder to the card holder's bank (McAndrews, 1992). The 
switch may route the transaction to the appropriate bank, the bank issuing the card used 
for the transaction, for processing, or it may do all processing itself. In either case, 
accounting for transfer of funds between banks, and for fees charged for use of other 
banks' ATMs, are also processed by the switch (Clemons, 1990). Smaller banks such as 
Bank C can use the ATM processing services provided by other banks or third-party 
vendors that sell ATM management capabilities to gain processing capability. 
Figure 2. Typical Shared Electronic Banking Network 
ATM 
Shared Network I Switch I 
ATM ATM ATM ATM ATM 
Own Bank Customers 1 Network Customers 
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In general, there are three types of network ATM transactions, summarized in 
Table 2. Us-on-us refers to the use of a bank's ATMs by its own card holders, for 
example, the use of Bank A's ATMs by its card holders. Such transactions typically are 
not routed through the shared network's switch, and usually are processed within the card 
holder's bank. Others-on-us refers to the use of a bank's ATMs by card holders from 
other banks. Us-on-others refers to the use by a bank's card holders of another bank's 
ATMs. For example, when Bank C's card holders access their accounts using Bank A's 
ATMs, the transactions initiated are others-on-us to Bank A, but us-on-others to Bank C. 
Us-on-us transactions provide a minimum level of electronic banking services demanded 
by customers. Us-on-others and others-on-us represent additional transactions that 
require interchange. In each case, the research evidence has shown that customers are 
willing to pay for the additional banking services and locational convenience (Banker and 
Kauffinan, 1991; McAndrews, 1992). 
Table 2. Typical ATM Transactions in Shared Electronic Banking Networks 
Types of Transaction Brief Description 
The use of a bank's ATMs by its card holders. 
The use of a bank's ATMs by card holders from another 
bank. 
The use by a bank's card holders of another bank's ATMs. 
3.2. The Determinants of Network Adoption and Hypotheses 
Several firm characteristics are likely to be important determinants of technology 
adoption. In particular, much of the theoretical and empirical diffusion research suggests 
that firm size plays an important role in decisions to adopt new technologies (Rose and 
Joskow 1990). In fact, a substantial part of the variation in technology adoption in 
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previous research can be explained by interfirm differences in size (Mansfield, 1968), and 
the data point to a positive relationship between early adoption and firm size. For 
example, Hannan and McDowell (1984) found that larger banks evidenced a higher 
probability of adoption of ATMs. 
There are many reasons why large firms tend to be early adopters. They may 
have more resources available to finance an investment, may be better able to take the 
risks, and may expect the technology to be more profitable than their smaller rivals 
(Mansfield, 1993). Hence, the costs and risks of early adoption are more easily borne by 
large firms. Size itself, however, is not related to innovativeness by logical necessity; it 
becomes significant only when it implies or indicates the conceptual variables that are 
important in themselves (Mohr, 1982). In other words, size may also have indirect 
effects because it can be a surrogate for many other potential explanatory variables and 
may not contribute to the benefits of adoption directly. It is likely to lead directly to 
scale economies which enhance the feasibility of adoption such that larger firms can 
justify adoption of new technology. It is also likely that size is correlated with 
accumulated experiences and technological skills, or what Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
call absorprive capaciy which diminishes the threshold for extracting know-how from 
others. 
Irrespective of size, any of a number of firm characteristics may make a new 
technology profitable and desirable for one company, but not for another. In other 
words, differences in characteristics among firms might be a potential source of business 
value or competitive advantage in the adoption of technology. In the remaining sections, 
we discuss several firm characteristics that may contribute to the net benefits of adoption 
and thus increase the probability of early adoption. We analyze the net benefits to a 
potential adopting bank in terms of the benefits and costs of network adoption, expressed 
as a function of bank characteristics. On the cost side, we consider the opportunity costs 
associated with the adoption of a shared network. On the benefit side, we consider 
revenues increase due to enhancement in customer account access convenience. We 
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assume that banking firms.are generally able to estimate the economic benefits 
associated with the adoption of a shared electronic banking network, and use it as a basis 
for making network adoption decisions. In other words, the greater the perceived business 
value of network membership, the earlier the adoption. 
Saloner and Shepard (1991) argued'that the proprietary network benefits to a 
bank's customer is an increasing function of the number of ATMs the bank has deployed 
as a result of being able to access her account more conveniently. Thus, the network 
benefits to the bank is also increasing in the number of ATMs deployed. In the context 
of shared electronic banking network, however, there may be opportunity costs for banks 
that have proprietary ATM networks prior to shared network membership because they 
already enjoy internally generated network benefits. Thus, banking firms with a large 
proprietary ATM network are not necessarily willing to jump right into a shared 
electronic banking network, letting all other members share the large number of ATMs 
that they contribute. 
The classic example of this in the United States is Citibank, which initially 
deployed the largest proprietary electronic banking network in the New York City area, 
and has come to be recognized as a leader in the production of innovative electronic 
banking hardware and software. (For example, today Citibank deploys touch screen 
technology-based ATMs that can handle five different languages: English, Spanish, 
Chinese, Greek and Korean.) As a result of this deployment, Citibank was able to 
increase its deposit market share from 4% to 13.4% of the New York Metropolitan 
market total, the largest share of the richest banking market in the country (Glaser, 
1988), fueling its expansion throughout the 1980s. All the way until 1992, the bank 
steadfastly resisted efforts by the major national networks, CIRRUS and PLUS, to share 
its network. 
Banks with small ATM networks, however, may have low opportunity costs, but 
greater motivation to join a shared network to achieve economies of scale or reach out 
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geographically to enhance customer coverage, particularly when the current trend toward 
more efficient third-party processors is already helping to solve the technology dilemma 
for small and medium-sized banks (Croxford, 1988). In addition, they may view shared 
networks as a mechanism to avoid competitive disadvantage. 
Thus, we expect the opportunity costs for a bank to be increasing in the size of its 
own ATM network, and banks with a large ATM network are likely to adopt later. On 
the other hand, banks with few or no ATMs are more likely to adopt early. We use the 
number of bank branches operated by a bank as a proxy for the number its ATMs 
because branch offices are the most common and lowest cost locations for ATMs 
(Saloner and Shepard, 1991). Thus, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The smaller the number of a bank's branch ofices) the more likely will 
be earlier adoption of a shared network. 
As described earlier, the benefits of a shared electronic banking network to a 
bank's depositor as a result of being able to access her account more conveniently can 
lead to increase in revenues to the bank, which can be assumed to be proportional to the 
value increase to the depositors. Thus, the benefits of shared network adoption for a 
bank should be increasing in the number of its depositors. In other words, we expect 
that the larger the number of a bank's depositors, the greater the perceived business 
value of network adoption, and thus the more likely will be earlier adoption. We use 
total dollar amount of demand deposits as a proxy for the number of bank depositors 
that demand ATM services. 
Hypothesis 2: The larger a bank's total demand deposits, the more likely will be earlier 
adoption of a shared network. 
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Finally, banks whose depositors demand more ATM services may find greater 
value in shared network membership. In other words, a bank that is more retail-oriented 
may value a shared network more highly and adopt earlier because its depositors tend to 
use network ATM services more often, which results in revenue increase to the bank. 
Because cash withdrawals from checking accounts represent the most common 
transaction performed with ATMs (Hannan and McDowell, 1984), we indude a measure 
of product mix defined as the proportion of the bank's total deposits accounted for by 
demand deposits to capture the extent of its retail orientation. We expect that banks 
specializing more in retail banking will find shared network services relatively more 
attractive. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the ratio of demand deposits to total depaits, the earlier will 
be the adoption of a shared network. 
2 
In summary, the net benefits, II, from shared network adoption for a bank can be 
expressed in the following function: 
The net benefit function is increasing in NDEPOSITOR, the number of depositors that 
demand ATM services, and MIX, the extent of retail orientation. However, the function 
is decreasing in NAm, the number of a bank's ATMs deployed in its proprietary ATM 
network. Thus, banks with high values of NDEposfToR and will tend to adopt earlier, 
while a high value of NAm will have a negative impact on early adoption. 
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4. Method and Results 
This section describes the research site, sample, data collection and measurement. 
In addition, we discuss the categorization of our sample into earlier and later adopters 
and present the results of the econometric analysis. 
4.1. Research Site 
New England Network Inc., the Connecticut-based owner of the Yankee 24 
shared electronic banking network, allowed us to have access to their member list and 
adoption data. Yankee 24 was founded by nine banking firms in 1983 to establish a 
regionally shared network. In July 1984, the network went into operation, and began to 
seek other banking firm members. At the time, state regulatory policies for shared ATM 
networks in Connecticut ruled that ATMs were not branches and that ATM sharing 
should be mandatory, requiring membership to be open to all depository institutions in 
Connecticut with all members sharing ownership of the non-profit network organization. 
Thus, potential entrants could become members by requesting to join Yankee 24. Out- 
of-state banks, however, were prohibited from establishing or using ATMs within the 
state at that time. 
Each participating bank paid a one-time membership fee of $5,000, a terminal 
hook-up fee of $300 per ATM, and an ongoing monthly fee of $35 per ATM. Yankee 
24, the network operator, is responsible for overall network strategy for marketing and 
advertising. Services offered by the network include withdrawal, deposits, transfers, and 
cash advances. In 1985, Yankee 24 became the largest shared electronic banking 
network in New England in terms of number of ATMs shared and interbank ATM 
transactions. By 1987, Yankee 24 had 127 members and 789 ATMs in the network. In 
February 1987, banking firms in other New England states were allowed to join the 
shared network organization, and the network's marketing staff began to actively solicit 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-93-25 
19 
new members in those states. By the time of this study, Yankee 24 had grown to be the 
dominant shared electronic banking network in New England. It included more than 700 
network members, and more than 4,000 ATMs accessible to all members' ATM card 
holders. 
4.2. Sample, Data Collection and Measurement 
Our data set includes Yankee 24 membership data and firm characteristics for 
banks in the New England area. Network adoption data were obtained from New 
England Network Inc. Banking firm characteristics were obtained from periodic reports, 
including the Report of Condition and Income (referred to in the banking industry as a 
"call report") and the Summary of Deposits (SUMD) maintained by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Additional information related to bank branches and locations was obtained from 
Polk's Bank Directory (1987). 
A list of 1448 banking firms that operated in the New England area was obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Because Yankee 24 started in 
Connecticut in 1984 but banking firms in other New England states were allowed to join 
the shared network only after 1987, earlier adopters were essentially in Connecticut. 
Therefore, we divided all banking firms in our sample into two groups, one for those 
based in Connecticut and one for all others in New England. To focus on the adoption 
and diffusion of Yankee 24 after it was established, the founding members were excluded 
from our sample, yielding a total of 1439 banking firms, 484 in Connecticut and 955 in 
other New England states. 
Explanatory variables that are present in our data set include: (1) the number of a 
bank's branch offices (coded as BRANCH-NETWORK), as a proxy for the size of its 
proprietary network; (2) demand deposits as a percentage of total deposits (coded as 
PRODUC-T_MIX), a proxy for a bank's retail orientation; and (3) the log of total 
demand deposits (coded as DEMAND-DEPOSITS, with the logarithm used because the 
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distribution of demand deposits is skewed), a proxy for the number of depositors that may 
demand ATM services. Table 3 summarizes these variables. Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics for our sample in Connecticut and upper New England. 
Table 3. Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
BRANCH-NE3WOR.K The number of branch offices operated by a bank. 
DEMAND-DEPOSITS The log of total demand deposits. 
PRODUCT-MIX Product mix, defined as the ratio of number of dollar 
amount of demand deposits and dollar amount of total 
(demand plus time) deposits. 
- 
Table 4. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Connecticut 
Mean S.D.' 
Umer New Endand 
Mean S.D. 
BRANCH-NETWORK 2.897 10.586 3.914 6.973 
DEMAND-DEPOSITS 7.828 2.476 8.653 2.617 
PRODUCT-MIX 0.040 0.096 0.095 0.148 
' standard deviation. 
4.3. Results 
To categorize banking firms in our sample into earlier and later adopters, we employ the 
classification scheme proposed in (Mahajan, Muller, and Srivastava, 1990), which makes use 
of the analytical properties of the Bass diffusion model. Using annual growth data on 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-93-25 
Yankee 24 members in Connecticut, we estimate the cumulative adopter distribution formula 
presented in Equation (1) using non-linear least squares estimation. The coefficients p and 
q in Equation (1) are . l l5  and .685, respectively: both are significant at the .O1 level, and 
the adjusted R2 of the model is .982. Recall that p is the coefficient of innovation and q is 
the coefficient of imitation. Using the estimated coefficients to calculate TI, the time interval 
of early adoption expressed in Equation (2), we obtain a value for TI, which is equivalent 
to 7 months after Yankee 24 started. For our sample in other New England states, we also 
estimate the cumulative adopter distribution formula using the associated Yankee 24 annual 
member growth data. A p value of .092 and a q value of .45 are obtained, both significant 
at the .O1 level with the adjusted R2 of .99l. These coefficients translate to a TI value of .51, 
i.e., 6 months after Yankee 24 crossed the Connecticut state boundary. 
In sum, for our sample in Connecticut, those firms which adopted Yankee 24 earlier 
than March 1985 are categorized as earlier adopters, and all others as later adopters. As 
a result, 21.9% of the Connecticut-based banking firms are in the earlier adopter category. 
For our sample in other New EngIand states, those firms which adopted Yankee 24 before 
August 198'7 are categorized as earlier adopters, and all others as later adopters. Thus, 
16.1% of the banking firms in New England in our sample are in the earlier adopter 
category. Table 5 presents a distribution of our sample and adopter categories. 
Table 5. Distribution of Sample and Adopter Categories 
Area Number of Firms Earlier Adopters 
Connecticut 
Upper New England 
Total 
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TO examine the impact of the explanatory variables on the relative innovativeness of 
shared network adoption, we undertake separate analyses for our sample in Connecticut and 
other New England states. Because Yankee 24 network members are categorized into 
earlier and later adopters, the model we consider employs a binary dependent variable, 
coded as 0 and 1, for later adopters and earlier adopters, respectively. Due to the presence 
of the value-limited dependent variables, straightforward regression analysis is not able to 
provide unbiased estimates of the model parameters, and thus is not readily applicable 
(Greene, 1990). Instead, the probit model, frequently used in econometric analysis of 
models involving discrete choices, is employed for this purpose. 
For our sample in Connecticut, the probit model estimated is significant at the .O1 
level. All independent variables but PRODUCT-MIX are significant at the .10 level. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that DEMAND-DEPOSITS and PRODUCT-MIX have a 
positive impact, while BRANCH - NETWORK has a negative impact on early adoption, as 
expected. For our sample in other New England states, the probit model itself as well as 
all independent variables are significant. Consistent with the estimation results for 
Connecticut, PRODUCT-MIX and DEMAND-DEPOSITS have a positive impact, while 
BRANCH - NETWORK registers a negative impact on early adoption. Table 6 summarizes 
the estimation results for the state of Connecticut. 
Both probit models indicate that the number of branch offices operated by a bank, 
its total demand deposits, and the proportion of its total deposits accounted for by demand 
deposits are important predictors of earlier adoption. It appears that the number of a 
bank's branch offices, a proxy for the size of its proprietary network, has a negative impact 
on early adoption. 
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Table 6. Probit Model Estimation Results 
Variables 
Connecticut Upper New England 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
(Standard error) (Standard error) 
BRANCH-NETWORK -0.017 
(.010) 
DEMAND - DEPOSITS 0.409 
(.05 2) 
PRODUCT - MIX 1.002 
(.85 4) 
Constant 
5. Conclusions and Discussions 
In this section, we present the conclusions of this study, and discuss the limitations 
and possible extensions for future research. 
5.1. Conclusions 
Using electronic banking as a context, we examine the determinants of early IOS 
adoption. We employ an economic approach that views adoption primarily in terms of the 
perceived network business value, which is expressed as a function of key firm 
characteristics. By estimating simple econometric models using a data set that includes 
Yankee 24 adoption data and banking firm characteristics, we examine differences between 
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earlier and later adopters to gauge the impact of the determinants of network adoption. 
The results support our hypotheses that the smaller the number of branch offices, the 
more total demand deposits, and the higher the ratio of demand deposits over total deposits, 
the earlier the adoption of shared electronic banking networks. Thus, the empirical results 
tend to support a perceived net benefit function of network adoption that is increasing in 
the number of depositors that demand ATM services and the extent of retail orientation, 
and decreasing in the size of a bank's proprietary ATM network. The results also support 
the idea that the adoption of shared electronic banking network is a rational economic 
decision, i.e., the greater the perceived business value of network membership, the earlier 
the adoption. 
Our findings are similar to those reported by Hannan and McDowell (1984) and 
Saloner and Shepard (1991), who investigated the adoption of ATM technology. However, 
we find that the number of bank branches registered a negative impact on early adoption, 
which is contrary to the finding by Saloner and Shepard (1991), in which the number of bank 
branches is a proxy for the proprietary network benefits. Our result suggests that the size 
of the proprietary network is associated with high opportunity costs of shared network 
adoption. A recent interview with the president of New England Network Inc. confirmed 
this finding1. 
This study offers some useful methodological ideas for senior management. The chief 
executive officer at our sponsoring organization is currently rolling out a large debit card 
program in the New England area. The marketing effort involves approaching and 
convincing firms that have not yet done so to adopt point-of-sale debit technology, as an 
alternate method of payment for their customers. Knowledge of the key drivers that lead 
to adoption of this related technology will be an important ingredient in the success of the 
IPersonal communication with Richard Yanak, President, Yankee 24/New England 
Network Inc., Wallingford, Connecticut. 
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program, because it will enable network marketing staff members to focus on the "right" 
segment first -- the innovators and early adopters, and then the early majority. 
Although the context of this study is shared electronic banking networks, the 
examination of the adoption of a single technology in a single industry avoids the difficulties 
encountered in many previous research in controlling for differences across innovations in 
capital costs and/or potential profitability (Hannan and McDowell, 1984; Rose and Joskow, 
1990). The results of this study may have implications for other IOSs, such as nationally 
shared electronic funds transfer networks, securities settlement systems, credit card switching 
and transaction confirmation systems, and SWIFT. 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Several shortcomings and limitations of this study should be acknowledged. Because 
we studied one very large network (Yankee 24) in one limited region of the United States 
(New England), the generalizability of the results is limited. The reader should not assume 
that our results can be generalized to the case of adoption of shared electronic banking 
networks in other regions of the U.S., or to other countries, such as France, the United 
Kingdom or Japan, where electronic banking is a mature business for most banks. We are 
presently undertaking additional research to examine the differences (Kauffman, in process). 
Due to the limited availability of data and the inability of the probit model to handle 
time-varying variables, we were only able to examine the impact of a subset of variables that 
are likely to influence the net benefits of network adoption. For eriample, further study 
should incorporate pricing and cost of input variables. 
The economic approach employed in this study may be limited because it is 
theoretically indifferent to institutional factors on either the supply or demand side (Brown, 
1981). By focusing solely on the perceived business value of network adoption, it ignores 
non-monetary factors that may potentially affect adoption decisions, such as patterns of 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-93-25 
26 
communication and influence (Rogers, 1983), organizational structure and decision hierarchy, 
technical know-how and organizational learning (Attewell, 1992), innovation champions 
inside the adopting firm, inter-firm linkage and power relationships, and the supply-side 
competitive environment and the structural characteristics of the adopter industry 
(Robertson and Gatignon, 1986)) which were not present in the data set. 
In addition, network externalities, well known in economics literature as the value of 
a network created as a by-product of an existing installed base, may be an important source 
of business value that may influence the valuation and adoption of shared electronic banking 
networks. Because probit model is not rich enough to incorporate time-varying covariates, 
such as the growth of the network installed base, additional research may employ a more 
sophisticated econometric model to measure the actual extent cf network business value 
externalities and their impact on the timing of adoption. 
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